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Abstract
We demonstrate how the problem of determining the ask price for electricity
swing options can be considered as a stochastic bilevel program with asym-
metric information. Unlike as for financial options, there is no way for basing
the pricing method on no-arbitrage arguments. Two main situations are ana-
lyzed: if the seller has strong market power he/she might be able to maximize
his/her utility, while in fully competitive situations he/she will just look for a
price which makes profit and has acceptable risk. In both cases the seller has
to consider the decision problem of a potential buyer  the valuation problem
of determining a fair value for a specific option contract  and anticipate the
buyer's optimal reaction to any proposed strike price. We also discuss some
methods for finding numerical solutions of stochastic bilevel problems with
a special emphasis on using duality gap penalizations.
Keywords: pricing, swing option, bilevel optimization, stochastic
optimization, Stackelberg game
1. Introduction
Swing options are derivative contracts  usually between a producer or
wholesaler, and a retailer  which give their purchasers the right to buy the
underlying commodity at a prespecified exercise price per unit during a fu-
ture term of validity. For each decision period within this timeframe the
purchaser is allowed to choose the quantities delivered within prespecified
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bounds. Swing contracts are widely used in energy related commodity mar-
kets. In this paper we are particularly interested in electricity swing options.
Two important quantification questions arise: pricing aims at finding an
exercise price such that neither the holder nor the seller of the option are
disadvantaged. On the other hand, valuation of an existing contract with
given exercise price should result in a fair resale price.
The valuation problem can be described (see e.g. [34]) by an optimization
problem for the buyer, where the optimal value corresponds to the economic
value of the swing option. The seller however has a different objective than
the buyer: he/she tries to find an optimal offered price with respect to his/her
own specification, but also needs to consider the buyer's reaction to this
offer (e.g. [11]). Since both agents take optimal decisions which are related
to each other, the very nature of the pricing problem is bilevel and of the
leader-follower type: the option seller plays the role of the leader, or upper
level decision maker, when setting the price, but he/she acts in view of the
reaction of the option buyer, who is the follower, or lower level decision
maker. Throughout this paper, we mark all upper level decision problems of
the seller by [UL] and those of the lower level option buyer by [LL]. Since
future spot market prices are not known at the time of contracting, and since
the buyer may make decisions at several time steps, we have to deal with a
multistage stochastic bilevel optimization problem.
For this reason we will review swing option modeling as well as stochastic
bilevel programming and introduce some new solution methods in the fol-
lowing. While bilevel programming and in particular stochastic (two stage)
bilevel programming has recently made considerable advances, stochastic de-
cision problems in electricity usually are large (in particular if formulated as
stochastic optimization problems defined on tree structures) and have cer-
tain nonstandard features. This means that standard algorithms can not be
applied or lead to unacceptable computation times.
This is true even for the simplest setup, where the optimization problems
of both agents are linear, given the decisions of the other level, but bilinear
if all decision variables are considered at once. On the other hand the swing
option problem is simpler than other typical bilevel problems in that all
decisions are determined by the seller's decision for a strike price, which is a
single number. The article will predominantly discuss such algorithms that
are able to deal with the complicated overall structure of the problem, but
are also suitable to exploit this special feature.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 reviews some basic facts
of electricity markets, describes the swing option problem from both, the
buyer's and the seller's view and states it as a multistage stochastic bilevel
optimization problem. Section 3 gives an overview of general solution meth-
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ods for bilevel problems and introduces two simple approaches, well suited for
the bilevel formulation described before. The section closes with a numerical
example on swing option pricing. In the appendices we add some technical
details on acceptability functionals.
2. Electricity prices and swing options
Because of the non-storability of electricity there is a layered structure of
short term markets, reaching from day ahead to real time. In addition, also
forward contracts exist in most electricity markets, with a gradual transition
from forwards with maturities up to 2 years to the day ahead spot market.
Forward contracts fix a price for future power delivery (the strike price) over
a specified period in the future.
Usually, such contracts are traded over-the-counter (OTC) as forward
contracts, or in standardized form. In the latter case they are called futures.
While settlement at electricity spot and OTC markets usually is physical,
futures markets mostly rely on financial settlement. We will not distinguish
between forward contracts and futures throughout the rest of the paper. In
fact, there is no difference in the valuation of the two contract types, if the
interest rate is considered as deterministic.
Given the non-storability of electric energy, the usual no-arbitrage ar-
guments for pricing forward contracts in financial and commodity markets
cannot be applied for power markets. A functional relation between the ac-
tual spot price St and forward prices is not observable. However futures
prices F0,tbegin,tend (i.e. the strike price of a futures contract with delivery be-
tween point in time tbegin and tend, agreed at time 0) are related to expected
prospective spot prices E(St) with tbegin ≤ t ≤ tend. [66] proposes to use the
simple relation
F0,tbegin,tend =
tend∑
t=tbegin
E [St], (2.1)
where electricity is delivered between times tbegin and tend. Others (e.g. [31,
9]) have made the effort to extend relation (2.1), which leads to
F0,tbegin,tend =
tend∑
t=tbegin
E [St] + risk premium(0, tbegin, tend). (2.2)
Based on real data, [30] shows that the risk premium is positive if tbegin is
small, particularly if it corresponds to a winter or summer month, and may
be negative if tbegin is large, i.e. several years. Similar results are discussed
in [32].
3
Other models for the spot price and/or the forward price structure 
in fact the whole arsenals of econometrics and finance  have been used as
well. E.g., starting with [60], mean reverting Pilipovi¢ spot price models with
different number of risk factors have been formulated. See [22] for a broad
overview of spot and future price models.
2.1. Swing options
Swing options can be considered as the simplest and most important types
of option-like electricity contracts and are also known as flexible nomination
contracts, take-or-pay contracts, or virtual power plants. See e.g. [41, 4, 62,
61].
A swing option gives its buyer (or option holder) the right to get a com-
modity at a price K per unit, which is fixed now, but allows to choose the
actual purchase quantities in a later moment of time. For electricity swing
options we will state the price as K EUR per MWh. For simplicity we will
assume that delivery takes place at equidistant periods t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T}. The
actual demand has to be specified one period (usually a day) before delivery.
For the t-th period, the demanded and delivered amount of energy (MWh)
is denoted by yt, where t ∈ T = {0, 1, . . . , T − 1}.
Usually, demands for each period (often expressed by maximum devia-
tions from a base-line schedule) and the quantity bought over the full con-
tract period must lie within certain bounds. Such volume constraints can be
expressed as
et ≤ yt ≤ et ∀t ∈ T (2.3)
E ≤
T−1∑
t=0
yt ≤ E (2.4)
Here et,et denote the lower and the upper bound of energy consumption yt
for the t-th period, while E, E denote the overall lower and upper bounds for
the whole contract duration. Sometimes those hard constraints are replaced
by penalty payments for exceeding et, E or falling below et, E.
If we map the index 0 to a point in time tbegin and introduce a time incre-
ment ∆t and a point in time tend = tbegin + T ·∆t, we can also handle swing
options related to the contract period (tbegin, tend] and with different decision
intervals ∆t, for instance hourly decisions. In this case the notification time
before delivery has to be h ·∆t with h = 24.
Note that often (2.3) is expressed in terms of power (MW ) fixed at the
beginning of a period, so in principle we could base all decisions on power pt
and substitute
yt = ∆t · pt. (2.5)
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A possible additional condition are ramping constraints with ratchets %t
|pt − pt−1| ≤ %t t = 1, . . . , T − 1, (2.6)
limiting the changes in power demanded between consecutive periods. In
this case p0 has to be agreed as an additional parameter of the contract.
With given time increments ∆t, such constraints can easily be reformulated
as linear constraints on energy:
−%t ·∆t ≤ yt − yt−1 ≤ %t ·∆t. (2.7)
Constraints of this type can be important, if the period lengths are short
(e.g. hours).
We see that  unlike typical financial options  swing options are flexible
with respect to time and quantity and so is able to reduce both, volume risk
and price risk for the buyer. In both, the gas and the electricity industry
swing options have been used for many years, either as embedded options
related to general delivery contracts, or in the form of separate contracts.
Typical buyers in the electricity sector are public distributors with fixed
retail prices, facing random load and spot prices. See e.g. [19] regarding the
usage of swing options as hedging instruments.
Swing contracts usually are traded bilaterally and hence may be subject
to market power: often the seller of a contract will be a big producer or even a
big, state owned entity. On the other hand, if market efficiency and liquidity
are high, the seller's ability to set the price might be severely limited. We
will consider both cases in the following. In any case, the seller's scope is
limited by the buyer's possibility to buy the commodity at the spot price if
the swing-price is too high.
Two questions arise when swing options are analyzed:
 Valuation: Given the exercise price K, what is the value of a swing
option for the buyer?
 Pricing: What exercise price K should be offered by the seller?
In view of the preceding discussion it is clear that the answers, in particular
to the second question, will be more complicated than in financial option
pricing and involves optimal decisions of both, the buyer and the seller.
2.2. The buyer's view
Any valuation of a contract should involve the option holder's optimal
exercise strategy. Consider a pure trader, who  in addition to buying a swing
option  is able to buy and sell electricity at the spot market. His objective
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is to maximize the profit by taking any arbitrage opportunity between the
strike price and market prices. In the basic setup the trader maximizes
his/her expected value.
A simple swing option contract with exercise price K (which is set by the
option seller) and constraints (2.3), (2.4) can be described by the following
multistage stochastic program:
[LL]
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
maxy
∑T−1
t=0 E [yt (St+1 −K)]
subject to
et ≤ yt ≤ et, ∀t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}
E ≤∑T−1t=0 yt ≤ E
yt ≥ 0, ∀t ∈ T
yt / Gt,
(2.8)
where yt / Gt = σ (S1, . . . , St) denotes measurability of the decisions with
respect to the filtration G = (G0, . . . ,GT−1), generated by the past spot
price process. Note that in this formulation, decisions yt are taken at stage
t, while the corresponding spot price St+1 is only known one stage later.
Generalizations to the case where the notice ahead time is not one, but h
stages are straightforward, only St+1 has to be replaced everywhere by St+h.
Stochastic optimization is an important tool for risk management in en-
ergy production and trading, see e.g. [26, 54, 63] and hence also has been
used to formulate decision problems related to swing options: the formulation
(2.8) was introduced in [11]. [34] proposes a similar program with additional
constraints, see also [28]. Using a Pilipovi¢ type spot price model, the idea
in [34] is that the optimal value of the objective function gives the value of
the swing option from the buyers view.
A market participant, optimizing (2.8), fully speculates against the issuer
of the swing option, as he will only buy, when spot prices are expected to
be high: this causes opportunity costs for the issuer. As pointed out for
example in [11] and [36] there are other market participants whose behavior
differs from a pure trader: their main goal is to satisfy the demand and not
to speculate. We mention demand followers with access to spot markets and
demand followers without access to spot markets. Both types of demand
followers - these could be retailers, selling electricity to end users at a fixed
price - have to cover a (stochastic) load at future points in time.
Another class  retail clients without access to the spot market, but with
access to providers with different prices  is considered in the context of
classical retail pricing by [13].
While a variety of modifications and extensions can be useful in cer-
tain situations, we will refer to formulation (2.8), because facing a pure
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trader/arbitrageur is a kind of worst case setting for an option seller. We
also mostly abstain from using expected utility or risk adjustments for the
option buyer's optimization problem, because his/her utility is unknown to
the option seller.
As an alternative, all models discussed so far can also be formulated and
solved in terms of stochastic dynamic programming. In this case at least
the amount of energy consumed up to time t has to be introduced as a
state variable, additional to the prices. Papers on valuing swing options by
dynamic programming include [67, 44, 39, 7, 3].
Often dynamic programming problems are solved approximatively. This
is also the case for problems related to swing option valuation. [53] extends
the least-squares Monte Carlo method, originally developed for the valuation
of American options (see [48]). Because the results of this method depends
heavily on the price models used for simulation, different variants have been
proposed in the following, see e.g. [33, 10]. Further simulation based valua-
tion methods were proposed in [38, 37].
2.3. The seller's view
Using the buyer's decision problem (2.8) and a suitable spot price model
we are able to valuate a swing contract with given strike price. Its value is
given by the maximum objective value, if the maximum is positive. Otherwise
the value is zero and the contract will not be concluded.
The main question from the seller's standpoint consists in setting a suit-
able strike price. From a finance point of view it seems natural to search
for a strike price that results in a value of zero for the buyer - such that the
buyer is indifferent between concluding or denying the contract (see [34]).
However, there are important differences between financial derivatives
and electricity derivatives. For financial derivatives, the key principle is the
no-arbitrage assumption: if a contract can be replicated by some strategy
involving only contracts, for which the price is already given, then the price
of the new contract is determined by the other prices in such a way that there
do not exist any arbitrage possibilities, i.e. no riskless positive income with
zero initial capital. The fundamental result in option pricing states that the
correct price can be found by looking at valuation measures, which make the
discounted underlying price process a martingale. If this martingale measure
is unique, one speaks about a complete market, otherwise the market is called
incomplete. In the incomplete situation, an interval of prices is determined:
if the price of the contract lies within this interval, no arbitrage is possible.
Notice that the existence of replicating strategies is fundamental for this
pricing method.
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In contrast, pricing in electricity markets cannot be based on the no-
arbitrage principle since for a given demand pattern  flexible or not  no
replicating strategies exist: electricity is not storable and there are only very
few instruments (i.e. contracts such as base and peak futures) available to
partially hedge a specific contract. In such a situation, a strike price resulting
in a value of zero for the buyer, might just be too high, especially in a fully
competitive setting without strong market power on the side of the seller.
Even the seller might be better off with a smaller strike price, because his/her
profit depends on the volume of sales, which is reduced by the buyer when
the price increases (see e.g. the example in section 4.5).
Instead of the no-arbitrage principle we use two alternative approaches
for modeling the decision of the option seller. Which one is more appropriate
in a given situation, depends on the market power relations between seller
and buyer:
 Expected profit/utility maximization: If the seller is (almost) a monopo-
list, he/she will be able to maximize the expected profit. Of course the
optimal decisions of the buyer  his/her reactions to any strike price
decision of the seller  have to be anticipated.
 Acceptability pricing: In a very competitive market the aim is just to
find the minimal strike price such that the profit and loss distribution,
resulting from optimal decisions of the buyer, stays "acceptable" for
the seller.
To describe the seller's problem in more detail we assume that he/she
has the possibility to get electricity at a price S˜t, which is typically lower
than the spot price St. This can be an internal (or transfer) price between
the production and the trading division of a generator and works as a proxy
for modeling the whole production process. If the seller is not an electricity
producer, one may set S˜t = St, assuming that the seller and the buyer
have access to the same spot market. We will not allow that the seller uses
simultaneously both, his own production with price S˜t and the spot market
with price St. The buyer has always to make his/her extra purchases on the
spot market at price St.
Suppose further that also there are M different types of future contracts
available. Each type m ∈ {1, . . . ,M} is characterized by a delivery pattern
τ , where τ(m, t) is the amount of electricity (in MWh) delivered in period t.
Typical patterns are the base futures (delivers 1 MWh at each hour of the
week), the peak futures (delivers 1 MWh Mon through Fri, 8 - 20 h) and the
Vattenfall GH0 profile (see [68]). Common futures are available for full years,
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quarters or months. The price per contract of the m-th type is denoted by
Fm.
The seller sets the strike price K and simultaneously buys quantities
x˜m ∈ R of futures contracts to hedge away as much risk as possible. We
assume that fractions of contracts can be traded. The decision vector x of
the seller then consists of K and the vector x˜ = (x˜1, . . . , x˜M) of quantities
bought on the futures market, i.e.
x = (K, x˜1, . . . , x˜M). (2.9)
We assume static hedging throughout this paper, i.e. hedging contracts using
electricity futures will be bought by the option seller at the time of contract-
ing and not changed later. With yt denoting the demand of the buyer as
above, the unmatched surplus/shortage in time period t is
M∑
m=1
x˜mτ(m, t)− yt.
This amount is valued by the internal price S˜t.
Denote by Wx the profit/loss variable of this contract from the seller's
point of view. It takes the values
Wx = K
T−1∑
t=0
yt +
T−1∑
t=0
S˜t+1
[
M∑
m=1
x˜mτ(m, t)− yt
]
−
M∑
m=1
Fmx˜m. (2.10)
Introducing the random quantities
φm =
∑T−1
t=0 τ(m, t)S˜t+1 the spot-value of the m-th futures contract,
δ(y) =
∑T−1
t=0 ytS˜t+1 the demanded quantities valuated at spot prices,
y¯ =
∑T−1
t=0 yt the total demand,
one can get rid of summations over time in (2.10) and just write
Wx = y¯K +
M∑
m=1
x˜m[φm − Fm]− δ(y). (2.11)
Assuming a probability model and a valuation functional Au (e.g. expec-
tation, expected utility or more general acceptability measures) the seller's
problem in the monopolistic situation can be stated as
[ULM ]
∣∣ maxK,x˜Au[Wx] = Au[y¯K +∑Mm=1 x˜m[φm − Fm]− δ(y)]. (2.12)
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In the competitive situation it can be formulated as
[ULC ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
minK,x˜K
subject to
A[Wx] = A[y¯K +
∑M
m=1 x˜m[φm − Fm]− δ(y)] ≥ q,
(2.13)
where q is some minimal level of acceptability.
It has to be kept in mind that in both cases the profit variableWx and the
constraints depend on the optimal exercise behavior of the contract buyer,
and hence indirectly on the upper level decisions K, x˜. The demand pattern
yt, its spot value δ(y) and the total demand y¯ are scenario dependent random
variables, which are found by solving the buyer's optimization problem (2.8).
So far it has been assumed that the buyer is willing to contract anyway.
In reality however, if the minimum consumption et > 0 and the strike price
is high, then the buyer might not accept the whole contract: yt ≡ 0 is always
a solution, even if there are lower bounds formulated in the contract, and the
constraint
T−1∑
t=0
E (yt (St+1 −K)) ≥ 0 (2.14)
has to be added to either the buyer's or the seller's optimization problem.
In most cases we will consider the lower level problem (2.8), augmented by
(2.14), which will be denoted by [LLE].
The subordination of the two sub-problems [ULM ], respectively [ULC ],
and [LL] resp. [LLE] makes the whole a bilevel problem with the buyer's
decision as the lower level and the seller's decision as the upper level. From
a game-theoretic viewpoint, these are Stackelberg games (also called leader-
follower game), where the leader determines the price, while the follower
communicates his/her demand based on the price information.
2.4. Swing option pricing as a bilevel optimization problem
So far our formulation of the combined problem [ULM ] (or [ULC ]) and
[LL] is incomplete: it is not clear how to deal with the fact that the lower
level decision variables yt appear in both, the upper levels objective function
and constraints.
Typically, in textbook examples the lower level solution y, given the upper
level decision x can be calculated analytically and is unique. In this case,
y can be expressed as a function y(x) of the upper level decision variable,
and hence it is possible to replace all occurences of y by y(x). The resulting
optimization problem depends only on x.
Unfortunately the situation is more complicated for the swing problem.
Analytical solutions can not be given for realistic instances, and [LL] is linear
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in y givenK. The latter fact means that unique solutions are not guaranteed.
For the sake of clarity, we review step by step some basic facts about bilevel
problems.
Deterministic bilevel problems: Suppose that x is the decision of an
upper level decision maker with objective f(x, y) and feasible set X. Given
x, the lower level problem [LL] with decisions y, objective g and feasible set
Yx is
[LL] y∗ (x) = argmaxy {g(x, y) : y ∈ Yx} . (2.15)
Two types of bilevel problems then can be formulated, see e.g. [16]. The
optimistic version assumes that the lower level decision maker chooses an
actual decision y∗ ∈ y∗(x) such that it is the best w.r.t. the upper level
objective f , which results in the upper level [UL] problem
[UL] max
x,y
{f (x, y) : x ∈ X, y ∈ y∗ (x)} . (2.16)
The pessimistic formulation argues that the upper level has no influence
on the decision y∗ ∈ y∗(x) and may choose the worst w.r.t. f :
[UL] max
x
min
y∈y∗(x)
{f (x, y) : x ∈ X} . (2.17)
The largest part of the bilevel literature focuses on the optimistic ap-
proach and we will follow this trend in the rest of this paper. However, see
[72] for a recent treatment of pessimistic bilevel optimization.
Even optimistic bilevel problems are nonconvex, and strongly NP-hard
(e.g. [8, 5]) if the lower level feasible set depends on the upper level deci-
sion. See e.g. [15, 56] for necessary optimality conditions. Note that bilevel
problems can be reformulated as MPEC problems, but as was demonstrated
in [17], local optimal solutions of the MPEC are not necessarily also locally
optimal for the original bilevel formulation.
A specific intricacy of bilevel problems lies in the fact that even for very
simple cases the feasible set of (2.16) can be disconnected. As we will see
later this is possible also for the swing option problem.
As a simple, but instructive example, consider an upper level determining
the price x of a good and a lower level determining the demand y(x). The
upper level maximizes the profit
[UL] max
x
x · y∗(x)
and lower level determines demand y by utility maximization, for example
[LL] y∗(x) = argmaxy{y0.9 + z0.9 : x · y + 3 · z ≤ 14, 1 ≤ y ≤ 5}
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The first constraint is a budget constraint.
Figure 1 shows the optimal y∗(x) in dependency of x (dashed line) and
the upper level profit function W (x) = x · y∗(x) (solid line). One sees that
this function has a local maximum at x = 2.75 and a global maximum at the
boundary x = 14. If the upper level has the additional constraintW (x) ≥ 11
(see the dotted line), then the upper level feasible set is not connected.
Figure 1: The optimal lower level decision y∗ as a function of the upper level decision x
(dotted line) and the upper level objective x · y∗(x) (solid line).
Stochastic bilevel problems: A bilevel problem with random parameters
is called a stochastic bilevel problem. Let (Ω,B, P ) be a probability space
and ξ be a random variable defined on Ω. Let in addition F and G be two
sub-sigma-algebras of B modeling the information available for the respective
decision maker. Finally, let Au,A` be probability functionals, like the expec-
tation, some quantile or any other acceptability functional. A stochastic
bilevel problem is of the form
[UL] max
x,y
{Au[f (x, y, ξ)] : x ∈ Xy∗(x), xC F , y ∈ y∗ (x)} , (2.18)
where y∗(x) is the solution set of
[LL] y∗ = y∗ (x) = argmaxy {A`[g(x, y, ξ)] : y ∈ Yx, y C G} . (2.19)
Here the measurability conditions x C F and y C G symbolize the infor-
mation constraints. We require that the lower level has at least the same
information as the upper level, i.e. F ⊆ G. If F ⊂ G, then the problem
has asymmetric information. If F = {Ω, ∅}, the trivial sigma-algebra, the
upper problem is called a here-and-now problem in contrast to a wait-and-see
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problem, where F or is nontrivial. Deeper analysis of two-stage stochas-
tic bilevel problems was done mostly for upper level here-and-now decisions
versus lower level wait-and-see decisions (see e.g. [73]).
Dynamic stochastic bilevel problems: In the most general formu-
lation, both the upper and the lower level problem are multistage, meaning
that a series of decisions is required from the upper and from the lower level
decision maker. Let F = (F0,F1, . . . ,FT ) and G = (G0,G1, . . . ,GT ) be two
filtrations in (Ω,B, P ) with Ft ⊆ Gt. A stochastic process (ξt) represents the
uncertainty, which is gradually revealed as time goes on.
Decisions (xt)t∈{0,...,T−1} and (yt)t∈{0,...,T−1} are now adapted random pro-
cesses, depending on the history up to time t. Furthermore, the criterion
functions must be extended for the process (ξt) and are described as
f(x0, y0, ξ1, x1, y1, ξ2, . . . , xT−1, yT−1, ξT )
for the upper problem and and
g(x0, y0, ξ1, x1, y1, ξ2, . . . , xT−1, yT−1, ξT )
for the lower one.
The upper level problem may look as
max
x,y∈y∗(x)
{Au[f(x0, y0, ξ1, x1, y1, . . . , xT−1, yT−1, ξT )] : x ∈ Xy∗(x), xC F} .
(2.20)
where xC F denotes the fact that the process of decisions is adapted to the
filtration F, and y∗(x) is the lower level solution set
y∗ (x) = argmaxy {A`[g(x0, y0, ξ1, x1, y1, . . . , xT−1, yT−1, ξT )] : y ∈ Yx, y CG} .
(2.21)
Swing option pricing as a bilevel problem: In the case of swing
option pricing, at first glance the upper level decision [UL] seems to be here-
and-now and not dynamic: decisionsK and x˜ are taken only at the beginning
and not at later stages. However the lower level decision [LL] y is an F -
adapted process, and hence the optimistic bilevel reformulation is  implicitly
 dynamic multistage. The swing option pricing problem specified by (2.8),
(2.12) or (2.13) can be rewritten as
[ULM ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
maxK,x˜,yAu[Wx] = Au[y¯K +
∑M
m=1 x˜m[φm − Fm]− δ(y)].
subject to
y ∈ y∗(x)
(2.22)
for the monopolistic case, or
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[ULC ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
minK,x˜,yK
subject to
A[Wx] = A[y¯K +
∑M
m=1 x˜m[φm − Fm]− δ(y)] ≥ q
y ∈ y∗(x),
(2.23)
in the competitve case, where y∗(x) is the argmax-set of the lower level
problem (2.8) augmented by constraint (2.14), i.e. [LLE].
The basic formulation of the competitive case [ULC ] goes back to [11],
whereas the monopolistic formulation [ULM ] is new. The overall Stackelberg-
type setup of the seller's problems is also similar to the electricity retailing
problem described in [13]. However the latter paper deals with the rela-
tionship between a retailer and its clients in view of competition between
retailers with different price structure. In this model clients do not have
access to spot markets and take their only decision  of supplier selection
 at the beginning of the planning horizon. The retailer decides on offered
prices purchases on spot, as well as futures markets. In this model, the lower
level (client) as well as the upper level (retailer) take here-and-now decisions.
The swing option problem is more complicated at the lower level, since the
option buyer has access to the spot market and is able to make time depen-
dent decisions. Conceptually, swing option problems deal with the relation
between a wholesaler and a retailer and not between a retailer and its clients.
Stackelberg-type problems have also been proposed for gas-markets in order
to model the relationship between pipeline operating companies and natural
gas shipping companies ([40, 18]). However those models are not focussed at
pricing. Further bilevel models related to energy can be found in e.g. [25, 13].
3. Solution methods for the swing option pricing problem
Generally spoken, it is not possible to solve bilevel problems based on
the formulations (2.8), (2.22) or (2.23) as optimization problems in function
spaces. If one wants to apply numerical algorithms and solve the pricing
problem with realistic data it is therefore important to discretize the formu-
lation. Before we discuss tree-structured discretizations of these problems,
we will review some methods to solve stochastic bilevel programs. We also
discuss stochastic quasigradient methods in some detail, because they can
be used to approximate solutions for both, the original and the discretized
problem, provided that it is possible to give an estimate for the gradient of
the lower level decision. Finally we propose some simple algorithms for the
important practical case of a linear formulation of the swing option problem.
Because stochastic gradient methods will not work for LPs, we will refer to
14
a penalty method and a simple bracketing algorithm for our two main cases,
the monopolistic and the competitive formulation.
3.1. Overview and References
There is a vast literature on the theory of deterministic bilevel prob-
lems and related algorithms, see [6, 16, 14] for overviews and general theory.
Extreme point algorithms are suitable for small, fully linear bilevel prob-
lems (e.g. [51]) and exploit the fact that the optimal solution of linear
bilevel problems lie in some extreme points. Because the described swing
option problems are not linear, such algorihms can not be applied. Gra-
dient/subgradient methods (e.g. [42],[65]) use subgradients or directional
derivatives to construct descent directions, see (3.1) below. Because bilevel
problems are hard to solve, also heuristics have been applied, see e.g. [12].
However the most popular approach extends the upper level problem by
necessary optimality conditions for the lower level decision problem and tries
to solve the resulting highly nonlinear optimization problem. See e.g. [50]
on dealing with general equilibrium constraints, and [2] for using the KKT
conditions. We mention two possibilities for dealing with the resulting com-
plementarity constraints: branch and bound methods and penalty methods.
The latter ( e.g. [1, 24, 35, 52]) use a penalty function in order to augment
the upper level objective function by a penalization of the equilibrium or
KKT constraints.
Typically, algorithms for stochastic bilevel problems are discussed in the
context of one- or two-stage stochastic problems. Usually, the models are
discretized and formulated such that the upper level has to decide here and
now, whereas the lower level is able to wait and see. An exception is e.g. [74].
Basically the main methods for general bilevel programs have be modified for
dealing with (two-stage) stochastic bilevel programs: gradient descent and
penalization methods were discussed already in [57]. Again, using necessary
conditions of the lower level problem as constraints for the upper level prob-
lem is an important approach, see e.g. [23, 46]. In the MPEC-framework
some papers also deal with equilibrium constraints for Nash-equilibria at the
lower level (e.g. [76]). Such approaches have also been applied to various
aspects of electricity and energy markets (see [75, 77]).
The situation for multistage decision problems is different, if the lower
level decision maker can not be considered as a clairvoyant: information in-
creases gradually over time. It is possible to reformulate stochastic programs
as deterministic equivalents and typical MPEC approaches have been used
in [13] and [18] for stochastic multistage bilevel problems.
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3.2. Gradients and the stochastic quasigradient (SQG) method
Gradient/subgradient descent methods can be applied to bilevel prob-
lems, if gradients or subgradients for the optimal decisions of the lower level
problem can be calculated (or estimated). This is also true for stochas-
tic bilevel problems and a convenient method in this case is the stochastic
quasigradient method, described in the following.
It should be kept in mind that the stochastic quasigradient method only
works for compact, convex upper level feasible sets, which means that it is not
applicable to the constraints used in our formulation (2.13) of the competitive
case. However, for a strictly concave expected utility formulation of the upper
level problem stochastic gradient-type methods can be used.
We begin with treating deterministic problems, i.e. special cases of (2.15)
resp. (2.17). For using gradient methods the feasible set Yx has to be defined
by equalities and inequalities. Suppose that the lower level problem is
[LL]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
maxy g(x, y)
h(x, y) = [hi(x, y)]i=1,...,p ≤ 0
k(x, y) = [ki(x, y)]i=1,...,q = 0
where g denotes the lower level objective function, y the lower level decision
variables and the feasible set is specified by the intersection of inequalities
hi(x, y) ≤ 0 and equations ki(x, y) = 0 for some functions hi, ki.
If the lower level problem has a unique solution for each x, under smooth-
ness and regularity conditions for the functions g, h and k (see [16], Theorem
4.11), one may find the directional derivatives of the solution y∗(x) w.r.t. x,
i.e.
∇x;dy∗(x) = lim
t↓0
1
t
[y∗(x+ td)− y∗(x)].
as the solution of the following quadratic program (set y = y∗(x))∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
minr
1
2
r>∇xxL(x, y, λ, µ) r + r>∇2xyL(x, y, λ, µ) d
∇xhi(x, y) r +∇yhi(x, y) d =
{
= 0 λi > 0
≤ 0 λi = 0
∇xkj(x, y) r +∇ykj(x, y) d = 0,
(3.1)
where
L(x, y, λ, µ) = g(x, y) + λ>h(x, y) + µ>k(x, y)
is the Lagrangian and (λ, µ) is a maximizer of ∇xL(x, y, λ, µ) d. These direc-
tional derivatives may be used to find the directional derivatives of the upper
level objective. By the chain rule, the directional derivative of f(x, y+(x)) in
the direction d is
∇x,df(x, y) = [∇xf(x, y)] · d+ [∇yf(x, y)] · ∇x,dy∗(x)
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at y = y∗(x).
The natural extension for stochastic bilevel problems are stochastic quasi-
gradient methods. These methods use estimates for the gradients based on
random sampling. For a single level problem
max
x∈X
F (x) = E[f(x, ξ)] (3.2)
one must find estimates ̂∇xf(x, ξ) based on random sampling for the gradi-
ents ∇xF (x). These estimates are called stochastic quasigradients, if
 E[ ̂∇xf(x, ξ)] = ∇xF (x) + bn
 Var[ ̂∇xf(x, ξ)] = σ2n
for bn → 0 and σ2n bounded or slowly growing. A possible choice for ̂∇xf(x, ξ)
in the univariate case are divided differences [f(x+cn, ξ)−f(x−cn, ξ)]/(2cn),
where ξn are randomly sampled (the so called Kiefer-Wolfowitz method).
In the multivariate case, divided differences are taken in each coordinate
direction. Alternative methods for finding stochastic quasigradients can be
found in [58]. Based on the estimates ̂∇xf(x, ξ), the Robbins-Monro type
recursive algorithm for solving (3.2) over a compact, convex feasible set X is
xn+1 = piX[xn + an ̂∇xf(xn, ξn)] (3.3)
with ξn being independent random samples of ξ and piX is the (convex) pro-
jection onto X. (3.3) converges to the true solution provided that
an → 0,
∑
n
an =∞,
∑
n
an|bn| <∞,
∑
n
a2nσ
2
n <∞
and some global Ljapunov-type condition holds (see e.g. [69] or[47] or [43].
In the bilevel situation, the estimate ̂∇xf(x, y∗(x), ξ) must incorporate
an estimate of the lower level solution y∗(x) together with its gradient w.r.t.
x.
Given the actual upper level approximation xn and for fixed n, the lower
level solution is adapted in several steps s = 1, . . . , S as
y
(n)
s+1 = piY(xn)[y
(n)
s + cs
̂∇yg(xn, y(n)s )].
In order to get the derivative of the lower level solution w.r.t. the upper
level, one defines a second recursion where xn is replaced by xn + an:
y
+(n)
s+1 = piY(xn)[y
+(n)
s + cs
̂∇yg(xn + an, y(n)s )].
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Figure 2: An example of a spot price tree with 10 nodes, 6 leaves (scenarios) and height
T = 2.
The directional derivative of the lower level solution is estimated by
̂∇xy∗(xn) = a−1n (y+(n)S − y(n)S ).
Finally the approximation process for the upper level solution is
xn+1 = piX[xn + an(
̂∇xf(xn, y(n)S ) + ̂∇yf(xn, y(n)S ) · ̂∇xy∗(xn))].
The stochastic quasigradient method for bilevel problems was implemented
e.g. in [29]. However, it is not always easily possible to find gradients for
the lower level solution y∗(x). This is especially true for lower level problems
that are linear in y for given x.
3.3. Tree approximation
In this section we formulate the bilevel problem on a scenario tree. We
assume that the probability space Ω is finite and consists of k scenarios:
Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωk}. Because both the upper and the lower level problem
depend on stochastic processes (St and S˜t), the discretized probability space
has to carry a filtration and can therefore be represented as a finite tree with
node set N = {1, . . . , N}, where node 1 represents the root (see Figure 2).
The spot prices relates to the nodes of the tree and the related probabili-
ties are estimated from historical data, see e.g. [21, 59]. In addition, (2.1) is
used to ensure that arbitrage between spot and futures markets is impossible,
which would lead to unbounded problems.
The levels of the tree correspond to the decision stages. Let Nt be the
nodes at level t, for t = 0, . . . , T . The last level NT contains the k leaves of
18
the tree, which represent the scenarios and which play the role of the atoms
ωi of the probability space Ω. The tree structure (related to the filtration of
the process) can be defined by stating the predecessor node n− for each node
n. Furthermore, each node n carries a probability pn with
∑
n∈Nt pn = 1 for
all t.
The tree carries the spot price process, i.e. a spot price Sn is associated to
each node. In tree notation, the lower level problem (2.8) can be represented
as a linear program
[LL]
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
maxy,s
∑N
n=2 pnyn− (Sn −K)
subject to
et(n)+1 ≤ yn ≤ et(n)+1, ∀n ∈ Nt; t = 0, . . . , T − 1
sn = sn− + yn− , ∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N}
E ≤ sn ≤ E, ∀n ∈ NT
yn ≥ 0, ∀n ∈ Nt; t = 0, . . . , T − 1
(3.4)
Here K is the strike price of the swing option as before, t(n) denotes the
stage of node n and sn is the cumulative demand up to time t(n). Again it
is important to include the constraint
N∑
n=2
pnyn− (Sn −K) ≥ 0 (3.5)
if et(n) > 0 for some n, see (2.14). As above, we will denote the lower level
problem by [LLE] in this case.
To specify the upper level problems in a concrete way, we will assume
pure expectation as the objective for the monopolistic case and the average
value at risk AV@R (expected tail loss, conditional value at risk) as defining
the minimum acceptability for the full competitive case. See Appendix A
for a discussion of AV@R and its relations to quantiles as an acceptability
measure.
In the monopolistic case the upper level problem (with given demand
pattern y) is discretized in the following way:
[ULM ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
maxK,x˜
∑N
n=2 pnyn− +
∑N
n=2 pnS˜n
[∑M
m=1 x˜mτ(m,n)− yn−
]
subject to
x˜ ≥ 0
K ≥ 0
(3.6)
With the additional constraint x˜ ≥ 0 we assume that the only purpose of
the futures contract is to hedge away some risk. In the competitive situation
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the pricing problem can be formulated as
[ULC ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
minK,x˜,a,zK
subject to
c1 = −
∑M
m=1 Fmx˜m
cn = cn− +Kyn− + S˜n
[∑M
m=1 x˜mτ(m, t(n))− yn−
]
, ∀n ∈ N \ {1}
cn − a+ zn ≥ 0 ∀n ∈ NT
a− 1
α
∑
n∈NT pnzn ≥ q ∀n ∈ NT
zn ≥ 0
(3.7)
With α representing the α-level of the AV@R-functional and q being the
minimum required level of the AV@R, this representation uses (A.3) and
additional variables cn, accumulating the cashflows over time.
3.4. Some solution methods for bilinear swing option problems
As we have seen, typical standard approaches for bilevel programming
may fail for the multistage stochastic case because of the high dimensionality
of the problems. Furthermore stochastic quasigradient methods are not able
to deal with all linear formulations in a sensible way. However it is possible
to exploit some special properties of the LP formulations. Two observations
are critical.
 All programs (3.4), (3.6) and (3.7) are bilinear in x and y, which also
means that they are linear in x given y, and in y given x.
 While the dimensionality of variables and constraints may be very large,
all other decisions depend critically on the strike price: when the strike
price is known the lower level decisions can be calculated by solving an
LP. Given the strike price and the lower level decisions the remaining
upper level decisions (the hedges) can also be calculated by solving an
LP.
The second observation already suggests an algorithm that will be discussed
below, see section 3.4.1. The other algorithms will reformulate our bilevel
problems as ordinary bilinear optimization problems by penalizing the duality
gap of the lower level problem. Standard approaches for bilinear problems,
or a bracketing algorithm for the competitive case then can be used to find
local optima.
3.4.1. The monopolistic case: reduction to bilinear problems
The reformulated lower level optimization problem (3.4) has an objective
function that is bilinear in x and y, i.e. is linear in y for given x and vice
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versa. All constraints are linear. Using matrix notation it can be represented
in the following way1:
[LL : P ]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
maxy(c
>
1 + x
>C2)y
Ay ≤ b
y ≥ 0
(3.8)
for some suitable vectors b, c1 and matrices A,C2. Notice that the upper
level decision variable x appears here only in the objective and not in the
constraints. The dual of [LL:P] is
[LL : D]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
minv b
>v
A>v − C>2 x ≥ c1
v ≥ 0
(3.9)
with v being the dual variables. The primal-dual problem [LL:PD] minimizes
the duality gap and is therefore well suited for penalty formulations:
[LL : PD]
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
miny,v−(c1 + x>C2)y + b>v
Ay ≤ b
A>v − C2x ≥ c1
y ≥ 0
v ≥ 0
(3.10)
Notice that the primal-dual problem is a bilinear problem, which has a non-
negative objective, its optimal value 0 is obtained if and only if y (respectively
v) are the optimal value of the primal (respectively dual) problem.
In the monopolistic case the objective function of the upper level problem
(3.6) is also bilinear and can be formulated as
[ULM ]
∣∣∣∣ maxx x>f + x>DyLx ≤ `, (3.11)
for suitable f, `,D and L.
With [LL : PD] and [ULM ] as above the original bilevel problem can be
reformulated as a penalized bilinear problem [ULM + LL : PD] with linear
constraints. With penalty weight λ 0 this reads
[ULM + LL : PD]
∣∣∣∣∣∣
maxx,v;y x
>f + x>Dy + λ[(c1 + x>C2)y − b>v]
Lx ≤ `, Ay ≤ b, A>v − C2x ≥ c1
y ≥ 0, v ≥ 0.
(3.12)
1We leave to the reader to find the correspondences between the original parameters
and the new matrices and vectors. Notice e.g. that the sportprices St appear in the vector
c1 and the production prices S˜t appear in the vector f in (3.11).
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The reformulation as a bilinear problem extends the penalization pro-
posed in [71], where it was used for purely linear bilevel programs. Notice
that [ULM + LL] is bilinear in the objective but the constraints are linear.
In this case sequential linear programming (see e.g. [70]) leads to a local
solution. Algorithm 1 summarizes this approach. Recall that x˜ denotes the
vector of all components of x excluding the strike price K. To keep the algo-
rithmic description simple we assume that the problem is feasible (in y) and
that λ is chosen large enough, such that the duality gap is closed.
Algorithm 1 Bilinear iteration
Require: K0, λ > 0,  > 0
1: Set K := K0, as starting value
2: Solve (3.12) in x = (K, x˜) with K fixed, resulting in the solutions x˜, v, y
3: repeat
4: Set Kold := K
5: Solve (3.12) with y fixed resulting in the solutions K, x˜ and v
6: Solve (3.12) with x, v fixed resulting in y
7: until |K −Kold| ≤ 
8: Set K∗ := K, x∗ := x, y∗ := y
In addition, Branch and Bound methods can be used in order to find
improved local solutions.
If hedging is not possible one may also solve the pessimistic bilevel version
of [ULM ], which maximizes in x but minimizes in y. Algorithm 1 has to be
augmented as follows: after step 6 store the optimal value γ of (3.12). Before
step 5 in the next iteration solve the problem∣∣∣∣∣∣
miny x
>f + x>Dy
(c>1 + x
>C2)y ≥ γ
Lx ≤ `.
(3.13)
with x fixed. From the stance of the upper level the argmin y˜ is the worst
solution out of all lower level decisions that maximize the lower level objective
with given K. Finally use the y˜ instead of y in step 5.
For a more realistic model it is important to include the constraint (3.5),
such that it is possible for the lower level to reject the contract. If this con-
straint is included into (3.12), the same reasoning as above will lead to a
modified problem [ULM + LLE] that consists of the objective and all con-
straints of (3.12) plus the additional constraint (3.5). Unfortunately the
additional constraint is bilinear (in x and y) such that [ULM + LLE] is a
bilinear problem with bilinear constraints. While algorithms, using branch-
and-bound approaches, do exist for this type of problem (see [45],[49]), it
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might be more convenient to use a simpler method. First search for the
largest K = K+ such that all constraints of (3.4 plus the additional con-
straint (3.5) are feasible. This is a bilinear problem itself but by some simple
line search algorithm (in K) it is easily possible to find the value with suffi-
cient precision. Finally algorithm 1 can be extended: if K > K+ in step 4
for the first time then set K = K+ and solve (3.4) with this fixed K, which
leads to a new value for y. Then go back to to step 4. If K > K+ for the
second time, then go to step 8.
3.4.2. The competitive case: (probabilistic) bisection
In the competitive case with the upper level given by (3.7) we see that
bilinear constraints, related to the AV@R calculation, are inherently present.
While it is possible to reformulate the bilevel problem as a bilinear problem
[ULC+LLE] by following the arguments in the previous section, but replacing
the upper level (3.12) by (3.7), dealing with many bilinear constraints is much
more involved than dealing with the single bilinear constraint (3.5).
Denoting the upper level constraints in (3.7) by
x>gnx + y
>gny + x
>Hny ≤ β, (3.14)
for node n ∈ N , the full bilevel problem can be represented2 by
[ULC + LLE]
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
maxx,v;y x
>f + x>Dy + λ[(c1 + x>C2)y − b>v]
Lx ≤ `, Ay ≤ b, A>v − C2x ≥ c1
x>gnx + y
>gny + x
>Hny ≤ β (n ∈ N )
(c1 + x
>C2)y ≥ 0
y ≥ 0, v ≥ 0.
(3.15)
Note that this formulation also includes constraint (3.5).
For small trees a variant of the alternating optimization method works,
if (3.5) is not included, i.e. if (3.4) is used as the lower level. Such a case is
reported in [11] for the quantile pricing problem with AV@R constraint. Let
G(K ′) be the argmin of∥∥∥∥∥∥
min K
subject to
AV@Rα(Y(K′,x1,...,xM )) ≥ q.
Then it might be shown that the optimalK is the smallest fixpoint of G. This
is due to the fact that for finite probability spaces, y∗ is piecewise constant
2Again we leave the details to the reader. Note e.g. that the indefinite quadratic part
x>Hny refers to the product K · yn in (3.7).
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as a function of K, and the intervals of constancy can be found by looking at
the dual variables at the lower level solution. The overall problem can then
be solved by solving a sequence of linear programs.
A second simple algorithm uses the fact that the strike price K is the
main decision variable, determining the further decisions of both levels. A
bracketing type procedure is used to find the lowest level of K such that
all constraints are satisfied, and the dual gap of the lower level problem is
closed. This is basically a sequence of feasibility problems that finds the
minimal price, if the region K = {K : AV@Rα(Y(K,x˜)) ≥ q} is a connected
set. Algorithm 2 describes the approach: as before, the variable x denotes
all decisions taken by the upper level and contains the strike price K and
the hedge amounts x˜ = (x˜1, . . . , x˜m). [LLE] is the lower level problem (3.4)
augmented by the constraint (3.5). The function feas([OP]) applied to an
optimization problem [OP] takes the values true if the problem is feasible
and false if this is not the case. Again we assume for simplicity that λ has
been chosen large enough.
While this simple algorithm works fine in many cases, it should be kept in
mind that the set of possible strike prices K such that all feasibility criteria
are fulfilled might be unconnected for a given specification of the AV@R-
constraints. In this case the algorithm only finds a local minimum, and
lower feasible strike prices may exist. In order to deal with this problem it is
possible to use a probabilistic version of the algorithm by setting lbound := K
with probability pj in line 20 of algorithm 2 and lbound :=
(K−lbound)
2
with
probability 1 − pj. The probability pj should be monotonically increasing
with the number j of optimizations already calculated.
3.5. A numerical example
To illustrate the peculiarities of the swing option pricing problem we
consider two simplified swing contracts. All energy related quantities are
expressed in units of TWh, while prices are in Euro/MWh and the profit is
in Mega Euro.
With this convention for units we set et ≡ 5, E ≡ 50 and let the AV@R-
parameter be α = 0.15 and the minimum AV@Rα-requirement q = −35.
The spot price process St is modeled by a stochastic tree with 12 stages,
consisting of 893 nodes, with 200 scenario (leaf) nodes. Based on historical
spot prices we used simulated spot price scenarios to construct the stochastic
tree by a variant of [21]. Figure 3 shows the resulting spot price scenario tree.
Likewise, a process of internal prices S˜t (which are always smaller than the
market prices) was estimated and data were fitted to the tree. Finally, we
introduced the possibility to use three futures products (with exercise periods
of length 3) for hedging.
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Algorithm 2 Feasibility search with simple bisection
Require: K ≥ 0, 1, 2 > 0,M > 0
1: Set lbound := 0, ubound := 2K, δ := ubound − lbound, K∗ :=∞
2: while δ > 1 do
3: Set K := (ubound−lbound)
2
4: Solve [ULC + LLE] with K fixed, set feas(UL)=true
5: if it is feasible(and otherwise false)
6: if feas(UL) then
7: Get the solutions x˜, y, v
8: Set the duality gap η := (c1 + x
>C2)y − b>v for x = (K, x˜)
9: end if
10: if |η| > 2 or feas(UL)=false then
11: Solve [LLE] and set feas(LL)=true if it is feasible
12: (and otherwise false)
13: if feas(LL) = false then
14: ubound := K
15: else
16: lbound := K
17: end if
18: else
19: Set K∗ := K, x˜∗ := x˜, y∗ := y
20: end if
21: Set δ := ubound − lbound
22: end while
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Figure 3: Spot price scenario tree for a swing option example
We look at two cases, which differ with respect to lower bounds: in case
A there are no lower bounds for the demands, i.e. et ≡ 0 and E = 0. In
contrast, case B is defined by et ≡ 1 and E = 20.
In both cases we want to analyze pricing strategies for the seller of the
option. To this end we seek for the largest strike prices, such that the con-
straint (3.5) is fulfilled, and for the smallest strike price such that the AV@R-
constraint of the upper level is fulfilled. This gives a whole range of possible
strike prices. If the seller has some bargaining power, he/she will be able
to enforce a higher price than the absolute minimum. If the seller is a mo-
nopolist, he/she will be able to set the price such that her expected profit
is maximized, hence we also calculate the optimal monopolistic solution for
cases A and B.
Figure 4 shows the main results for both cases. The thick black lines,
overlaying the x-axis, shows the set of strike prices that are feasible for both,
upper and lower level. In case A it can be seen that for the chosen AV@R-
parameters this area is not connected. The minimum feasible strike price is
K = 47.2, while there is no maximum feasible strike price in this case: for the
lower level decision maker it is always possible to buy a zero amount in order
to avoid expected losses. While the AV@R of the upper level decision maker
is below zero within the feasible region, the upper level expected payoff is
positive for the whole range and shows a maximum at K∗ ≈ 48.9.
Figure 4 also shows the analogous results for the more realistic case B. The
set of feasible strike prices is connected now. The minimum feasible strike
price is K = 42.4, while the maximum feasible strike price is K ≈ 49.9. No
contract will be signed at a higher price. AV@R and Expectation broadly
develop in parallel, with their maxima at 49.1. Even in the monopolistic
case it is not optimal for the seller to target the highest feasible price. The
minimum constraint on demand is very favorable for the seller: in case B
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model type solution method
extreme point gradient KKT/MPEC other
deterministic [51] [42, 65] [1, 2, 24, 35, 50, 52] [71]
stochastic
two-stage [57] [23, 46, 77, 76]
multi-stage [29] [13, 18] [11]
Table 1: Overview of solution methods for bilevel problems.
the smallest feasible strike price is lower and the optimal strike price with
respect to expectation is higher than in case A. Furthermore, the AV@R in
case B is above zero for most of the feasible region. Finally, the expected
profit at the optimal point is much higher for case B.
Figures 5 and 6 show a comparison of lower and upper level effects, quan-
tiles of the upper level profit and details of the hedging strategy for both
cases, A and B.
4. Conclusions
Swing options are important types of derivatives at electricity markets,
and finding a suitable strike price is a key problem for producers and traders.
Because of the unique features of electricity markets the usual no-arbitrage
methods for option pricing can not be applied. As an alternative this article
gave a survey of game theoretic approaches, modeling the decision process as
a bilevel program, or Stackelberg-type game. After describing swing options
and reviewing basic facts about (stochastic) bilevel programs we considered
two basic (idealized) situations: the case of a monopolitic seller and the case
of full competition. In the first case the seller of the option maximizes his/her
profit, while in the second case he/she only has the aim to set the price such
that a certain risk level is not exceeded (acceptability pricing). In both cases
the buyer of the option is able to trade at the spot market or even reject to
sign an offered contract.
We also gave an overview of literature related to solution methods ( see
Table 1) for (stochastic) bilevel problems. Most of the classical methods are
not feasible for the swing option pricing problem: extreme point algorithms
can be applied only to linear bilevel problems, gradient methods need unique
solutions and the usage of KKT conditions leads to untractably large in-
stances. Therefore we proposed simple solution algorithms that are based on
discretized reformulations as bilinear problems. The analyzed algorithms for
both the monopolistic and the competitive case use bilinearity, penalize the
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duality gap of the lower level problem and account for the basic fact that
the strike price decision determines all other lower and upper level decisions.
Such approaches are especially useful in the context of big practical problems.
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AppendixA. Value-at-risk and average value-at-risk
Since riskless contracts do not exist in electricity markets, decision makers
have to use an acceptability criterion for contracts. If W is the random net
profit of a contract, then W ≥ 0 would be a clear criterion for acceptance.
However, such riskless profit is not possible. For financial options, the price
is considered to be correct if a hedge is found resulting in W = 0 a.s., but
for electricity contracts, a hedge does not exist. An acceptability criterion
accepts some W , even if P{W < 0} > W .
The most important acceptability criterion used in practical situations is
to accept W if
P{W < q} ≤ α, (A.1)
i.e. if the probability of a shortfall below q loss is smaller than some prede-
termined small value α. This is called quantile hedging/pricing, see e.g. [27].
Notice that using the value-at-risk functional V@Rα(W ) = inf{v : P{W ≤
v} ≥ α}, V@Rα(W ) ≥ q is equivalent to P{W < q} ≤ α. Unfortunately,
Y 7→ V@Rα(Y ) is not convex and V@R(Wx) is nonsmooth in the decision
x, which makes the optimization problems very difficult. For this reason, we
deal with concave minorants of V@R.
Concave minorants. Convex inner approximations of the (nonconvex)
level sets {W : V@Rα(W ) ≥ q} = {W : E[1l(−∞,q](W )] ≤ α} are given by
{W : E[k(W )] ≤ α}
where k is a convex majorant of 1l(−∞,q]. Examples are the kinked linear
functions ka(u) =
1
a−q [u − a]− or exponential functions hb(u) = eb(q−u), see
[55]. The condition E( 1
a−q [W − a]−) ≤ α for some a ≥ q is equivalent to
q ≤ a− 1
α
E([W − a]−)
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for some a ≥ q, which can be rewritten as
q ≤ max{a− 1
α
E([W − a]−) : a ∈ R} = AV@Rα(W ) (A.2)
where AV@Rα(W ) is the average value-at-risk, also known as conditional
value-at-risk [64]. Condition (A.2) can be rephrased as
∃a ≥ q,∃Z ≥ 0 such that W − a+ Z ≥ 0 and q ≤ a− 1
α
E(Z). (A.3)
It is easily seen that condition (A.3) implies V@Rα(W ) ≥ q.
As an alternative to the quantile pricing method, one may also consider
utility functions U and accept a contract, if E[U(W )] ≥ q. However, the price
will then depend on the choice of the entire utility function while in quantile
pricing only two parameters, the threshold q and the confidence level 1 − α
have to be set by the management.
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Case A: the upper level expectation E[UL] (dashed line) and the upper level AV@R[UL]
(solid line) as functions of the strike price K.
Case B: the upper level expectation E[UL] (dashed line) and AV@R[UL] (solid line) as
functions of the strike price K.
Figure 4: Summary of the bargaining situation from the seller's point of view
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Case A. Left: the lower level expectation E[LL] (dotted) and the upper level AV@R[UL]
(solid). The overall feasible set is the intersection of the sets AV@R[UL] ≥ −100 and
E[LL] ≥ 0. Right: the upper level expectation E[UL] (dotted) and the lower level expec-
tation E[LL] (dashed).
Case A. Left: quantiles of the upper level profit distribution (5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 95%)
as functions of K. The dashed line represents the expectation. Right: quantiles of the
lower level profit distribution.
Case A: the optimal upper decisions x˜1, x˜2, x˜3 about hedging contracts in dependency
of the strike price K
Figure 5: The bargaining situation, Case A
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Case B. Left: the upper level AV@R[UL] (solid) and the lower level expectation E[LL]
(dotted). The overall feasible set is the intersection of the sets AV@R[UL] ≥ −100
and E[LL] ≥ 0. Right: the upper level expectation E[UL] (dashed) and the lower level
expectation E[LL] (dotted).
Case B. Left: quantiles of the upper level profit distribution (5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 95%)
as functions of K. The dashed line represents the expectation. Right: quantiles of the
lower level profit distribution.
Case B: the optimal upper decisions x˜1, x˜2, x˜3 about hedging contracts in dependency
of the strike price K
Figure 6: The bargaining situation, Case B
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